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INDIA'S FOOD PRODUCTION 
In 1966 the fields of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute 
in Delhi and of the Agricultural Universities of North India were 
green with the evidence of a potential revolution in India's agricul-
tural production. The year 1966 must be counted as the founding 
year of the so-called "Green Revolution". It was the year in which 
the scientists knew with certainty that the biological basis for an 
immense increase in grain output was at hand. Despite the national 
shock of the sudden death of India's second Prime Minister, the 
human and economic cost of the sharp conflict with Pakistan of late 
1965, and of the almost certain crisis of domestic food supply follow-
ing the widespread failure of the monsoon rains in the previous 
kharif season, the mood of those few engaged in plotting the future 
of the nation's farm economy was one of ebullience. The problems 
and difficulties ahead would be many, but they were sure they had 
the solution to the long-sought goal of achieving a sizable increase in 
India's food production. 
It is significant that, IO years later, this lecture takes place on the 
Andhra coast under the sponsorship of Coromandel Fertilisers, since 
the transformation of Indian farming that followed 1966 was based 
on the productive interaction of plant nutrient, assured and timely 
crop moisture, and grain varieties capable of responding to high 
applications of each. The vision that preceded the construction of the 
Coromandel fertilizer plant gambled on matching the capacity of its 
nutrient manufacturing processes with the needs of a modern Indian 
agriculture. The experimental evidence of 1966 showed clearly that 
the stakes could be won. 
It was with this sense of history that I accepted the honour of the 
opportunity to give this lecture. Although the recent history oflndian 
agriculture is still to be written, the broad outlines of that history 
hold as lessons for a world faced with a prospect of famine already 
evident. My statement is a personal perspective that centres on issues 
fundamental to the agricultural progress of this great nation. 
I. 1947 to 1965: Trial and Doubt 
I use "food production" interchangeably with "foodgrain out-
put". This is not to say that the production of animal products, 
vegetables, fruits, etc., is unimportant in India. I do so only because 
non-grain food production is small compared with foodgrain output, 
and to an important degree, foodgrain statistics are probably an 
excellent proxy for total food supply. 
Food production in the early post-Independence years remains a 
statistical uncertainty. The slow absorption of the Princely States into 
the appropriate State and Central Government accounting systems 
leaves.one in some doubt about the validity of production data prior 
to 1955. Nevertheless, and however imperfectly measured, food out-
put rose during the First Plan period by over seven percent per 
annum, most of the rise occurring from an increase in the acreages 
used. The First Plan period ended with the widespread belief that 
sustaining agricultural production would not be a major economic 
problem. 
It was with the Second Plan that the first real doubts about the 
nation's food production were raised. By the end of the Second Plan, 
food output had grown by less than three percent per year. Spurred 
by the low harvest of I 957-58, the Government oflndia entered into 
a longterm P.L. 480 agreement with the United States to obtain 
regular shipments of U.S. surplus grain on concessional terms. 
Behind this agreement was an understanding that such shipments 
would be used to build national buffer stocks to meet future emergen-
cies of the kind that struck in 19 5 7-5 8 when production fell by over 
seven percent from the average of the three preceding years. 
I regard this first of several P.L. 480 agreements as one of the 
most important facts in the history of modern Indian agricultural 
development. Shipments under P.L. 480 agreements reached almost 
8 million metric tonnes per year by the mid-sixties. What began as 
emergency aid, with the intent of protecting the Indian consumer in 
times of trouble, quickly became part of a continuing subsidy of the 
nation's food economy. The attractiveness of augmenting the Central 
Government budget with the proceeds of the immediate sale of im-
ported grain was too great for the budget establishment in Delhi to 
forego, and the ready extra supply of grain assured planners of being 
able to stabilize food prices independent of domestic production. 
Perhaps most unfortunate was the coincidence of short-term interests 
between North America (for Canada, too, cannot escape the brunt of 
criticism in this account) and India - the Indian offtake was a boon 
to those in' Washington and Ottawa who sought to manage their 
grain surpluses by filling ships for Bombay and Calcutta. This mutual 
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desire to move grain halfway around the world had calamitous 
longer-term consequences: it held farm prices for the Indian culti-
vator to a level that sapped incentives to produce, and it lulled Indian 
planners and a few political leaders into believing that it was cheaper 
and more efficient to farm the fields of Kansas and Saskatchewan for 
the nation's grain than to invest, at the cost of slowing industrial 
expansion, in a domestic capacity to grow food. 
The price effect of the imports was most notable in wheat, with 
prices falling between 1959 and the third quarter of 1963. This drop 
resulted in a depression in private investment in the wheat areas of 
Northwestern India, the areas that had shown the greatest agricul-
tural dynamism in the decade following Independence. 
In retrospect, the neglect of farm prosperity in the late fifties and 
early sixties can only be deplored. But at the time, national decision-
making in India was guided by two major considerations: the impor-
tance of building the nation's industrial base, an aim that could be 
attained only through some exploitation of the agricultural sector 
which generated almost 50 percent of annual gross product; and the 
deeply held conviction that farm prosperity and rural economic dy-
namism depended less on the interplay of market forces than upon 
transformation and reform of the social, political, and economic 
institutions of the countryside. 
Concessional purchases of North American grain provided 
Delhi finance officials with an almost costless source of merchandise 
revenue; it eased the burdens on the planners of finding a balance 
between food, industrial production, and the control of domestic food 
price inflation the most sensitive element in urban politics and 
industrial wage rates. Indeed, the grain transfers enabled the nation 
to speed its industrial growth and, in particular, to opt for a different 
balance between military and civil expenditures after the China War 
of late 1962. With grain so freely offered, and the domestic economic 
balances so precarious and yet so vital to the nation's longer-run 
growth and security, it is hard to be critical of those who advocated 
farming North America's fields and using the proceeds for India's 
development. 
Yet, for all one can say to justify the decisions made in the late 
fifties and the first half of the sixties, the stark fact remains that 
Indian agricultural development was neglected. And the neglect 
proved to be shortsighted. The growth in agricultural production 
dropped from three percent per year between 1955 and 1960 to two 
3 
percent between 1960 and 1965; grain production growth fell from 
2.9 percent to less than l.6 percent in the same period. And reflecting 
the relative effects of food and non-food prices, the growth in produc-
tion of non-food crops rose from 3.0 percent per year in the fifties to 
almost 3.5 percent in the sixties - the shift brought about primarily 
through acreage transfers from food to non-food crops. 
To what extent the neglect of agriculture and the relative impov-
erishment of the nation's farmers in this period reflected economic 
factors alone, or a philosophy which was a mixture of economic and 
social-political elements, is hard to determine even for the involved 
observer. The Nagpur Resolution of the Congress Party on a cooper-
ative structure for the Indian rural economy was not based on a 
careful economic analysis of national agricultural needs. It was a 
political pronouncement, and it had as its aim social-political change. 
I think it is undisputed that the strength of landowning interests 
prevailed over the cooperation implied in the Resolution. But it is 
important to recognize that even the landless were not enthusiastic 
about the goals implied, for it was their hope to be owners in right, 
not to be cooperants with undefined shares. 
To understand this phase of Indian agricultural history, it is 
necessary to digress for a moment to the Community Development 
movement. It was an early effort at nation building among rural 
people that found its roots in emphasis on village uplift. The 
movement took on almost mystical tones in the early fifties as it 
sought to mobilize the energy and enthusiasm of rural India to 
transform through self-help and voluntary action their cultural, so-
cial, political, economic and physical milieu. It was too heroic a 
vision. It could not help but fail. To the villager it confused the 
important with the unimportant. In its transformation the imperative 
of change was placed above holistic view of the particular needs of 
rural folk. The movement foundered on the rocks of the short harvest 
in 1957-58. It left an important legacy, however: an administrative 
infrastructure of personnel and organization focussed on village de-
velopment. To this legacy, I think reactions must be mixed. The 
movement was strong enough to divide the country into development 
blocks each with its assortment of officers and field workers, but not 
strong enough to re-align and match to these boundaries the admin-
istrative jurisdictions of the allied public agencies, such as the elec-
tricity boards, public works authorities and irrigation offices. Thus, 
even today, the coordination of development efforts within and 
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between blocks in a district is often a frustratingly difficult chore. 
Indeed, there is a case for a re-examination of all of India's rural 
administrative boundaries with a view to making the coordination 
and implementation of development action much more effective. 
Yet for all the difficulties, many of the Community Development 
programs were and still are vital to India's rural progress. Commu-
nity Development-inspired voluntary road-building in the early fif-
ties was a failure. For most villagers, there was no economic reason 
to take land out of production to build a road. In the seventies, it is 
very different. Product and factor markets have opened, village peo-
ple are much more mobile, modem vehicular traffic density in most 
rural areas is large when compared to the first decade of Indepen-
dence. As India's economy has grown, the market-to-market roads 
that were needed to justify villagers investing in their own farm-to-
market links have been constructed. Listen now to rural people and 
village roads are a priority need, but they weren't in the fifties. The 
historical precedent of a program failure at that time should not be 
allowed to weigh heavily now. But in making this point, let me 
hasten to add that there seems no clamour now for bricked streets, or 
latrines, or smokeless chulas just as there was no clamour more than 
twenty years ago. 
The collapse of the drive behind Community Development in 
the late fifties can be traced to its immediate failure to provide a 
secure food base for the nation. The poor harvest of 1957-58 raised, 
for the first time since Independence, significant doubts about the 
"how" of agricultural, and particularly food production develop-
ment. It gave pause to those who advocated a sweeping reform of 
India's patterns of rural culture. The debate around the Nagpur 
Resolution turned into a sterile argument over scale-economies in 
farming. And while many scholars continued to find intrinsic merit 
in the proposed reforms as a means of bringing about a more equita-
ble distribution of rural wealth and income, this purpose w~s too 
often lost or forgotten in an expressed fear that any tampering with 
the fundamental cultural framework of rural India would result in an 
uncontrollable and unpredictable disruption of national stability. At 
the political level and among intellectuals of the country, the call was 
for an important and visible degree of rural reform; at the level of 
political action and among many of the voters, the degree of accepta-
ble, implementable reform was very much less. The large zamindaris 
were broken up, but sweeping reforms of the land tenurial system 
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were not implemented; village self-government was proclaimed, but 
the actual administrative and judicial power transferred to village 
panchayats was small; bottom-up planning was called for, but the 
problem for senior political leaders and their expert advisors was to 
educate the people to want a "top-down,, plan; people were encour-
aged to join and participate in local cooperatives, but cooperative 
affairs were tightly controlled by appropriate government depart-
ments and officials; rural debt reform and new and improved credit 
to small and tenant cultivators were called for, but debts remained a 
burden on the poor and public credit remained secured by instru-
ments of land ownership. The list could go on. For those who 
believed that India's peasantry would rise in revolt if the reforms 
were not implemented, the seeming docility of the rural people was a 
disillusionment; for those who viewed national political postures 
with cynicism, the result was predictable; for those who believed that 
Indian agricultural progress rested with primary weight on the full 
reform of rural institutions, the result was frustration. But it was for 
the many who believed that national agricultural advance could be 
made without the need of drastic reform that the years between 1960 
and 1965 bred disillusionment, cynicism, and frustration. 
The almost static growth of domestic food production in the 
early sixties brought about a growing reliance on imports. Except for 
the bountiful weather of 1964-65, Indian annual food output hovered 
around 80 million tonnes throughout the period. Net imports rose 
from 3.5 million tonnes in 1960-6 l to 6.3 million tonnes in 1963-64, 
and over these years net sales from small Government-held stocks 
totalled almost an additional two million tonnes. Yet, despite imports 
and stock reductions, per capita availability dropped each year from 
1961 to 1964. The result of this stagnation was an upward pressure 
on prices, a pressure held in reasonable check until mid-1963. 
Between March and June of that year, the composite index of whole-
sale food prices rose seven percent; one year later it had climbed 
almost 20 percent. The record harvest of 1964-65 ( 89 million tonnes) 
slowed the increase to just under 13 percent in that year. 
The failure of food production to respond to forces other than 
rainfall from roughly 1954 (at 72.2 million tonnes) to 1964 (at 80.5 
million tonnes) could not help but generate a large measure of doubt 
and despair among those responsible for the nation's economic well-
being. The unproductive apparatus of the Community Development 
programme was superseded in 1961 with the Intensive Agricultural 
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Districts Programme, popularly called the "Package Programme", a 
programme that was supposed to demonstrate the means for attain-
ing increased food output. It, too, did not succeed. In fact, at the end 
of its first five years, its major supporters could claim only that its 
implementation revealed clearly the problems to be encountered in 
getting agriculture moving. 
The period closed with drought in the summer of 1965 and by 
war later that year. Events that shattered all illusions. 
II. 1965-68: Despair and Hope 
The years 1965-66 and 1966-67 must surely be viewed in Indian 
history as both the nadir and the zenith years of the first quarter 
century of Independence. The weak monsoon rains in the summer of 
1965 set the stage for a national brush with catastrophe. The brief 
but sharp and costly war with Pakistan in the fall of 1965, and the 
tragic, sudden death of Prime Minister Shastri in January 1966, 
added immensely to the economic and political burdens of the na-
tion. The withdrawal of economic aid by the United States following 
the war served only to exacerbate an already calamitous situation. 
But of all these trials, the failure of food production to meet expecta-
tions posed the greatest threat to national integrity. The agricultural 
year 1965-66 saw total food grain output fall to its 1954 level of 72.3 
million tonnes - a drop of 20 percent from the 89.4 million tonnes 
record crop of 1964-65, and over 11 percent below the 82. l million 
tonnes average production of the previous five years. And to com-
pound the tragedy, 1966-67 was little better. Total foodgrain output 
in that year rose by only I. 9 million tonnes. 
Many of the consequences of these two disastrous agricultural 
years will be fruitful ground for exploration by various hyphenated 
historians in years to come. The still disputed devaluation of May 
1966 can be traced directly to the economic troubles of these years; as 
can the "plain pause" that scrapped the draft of the Fourth Plan, 
and postponed its start, to permit the preparation of a new plan by a 
new Commission who would take fresh account of the nation's dif-
ficult economic circumstances. Food imports were stepped up 
through commercial purchases and concessional assistance agree-
ments. Net imports in the two years totalled more than 19 million 
tonnes, approximately 13 percent of total domestic production. And 
prices rose despite rigid controls on grain movements in interstate 
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trade and an active procurement policy by both Central and State 
authorities. Grain prices at the end of 1965-66 were 50 percent above 
those of 1961-62; by the end of 1966-67, they were more than 82 
percent higher. The terms of trade between manufacturers and farm 
commodities were moving steadily in favour of the cultivator. The 
output transferred from abroad was no longer sufficient to overcome 
severely lagging domestic production and the inexorable growth of 
population. Once again, food availability per capita dropped to about 
the level of the late 1940 's. It was a low point in the course of 
national history. 
That India passed through the depths of the mid-sixties famines 
with so little human loss is surely one of the finest hours in the 
nation's history. There were countless heroes of this test of nation-
hood. Three that stand out in my recollections are the Prime Minister 
whose tough support of her food administration permitted it to func-
tion despite the many political and economic pressures it had to 
endure. The second was the Minister of Food and Agriculture, C. 
Subramaniam, who had overall command of both the famine relief 
and planning for the recovery. The third was the Secretary of Food, 
AL. Dias. Secretary Dias particularly bore the brunt of stretching too 
little among too many. To him especially the nation and the world 
owe a debt of gratitude for averting what could have been one of the 
very ugly chapters in the history of modern man. Indeed, when 
written, the story of those years will proclaim the greatness of the 
nation and its servants. It was truly a time of test; the challenge was 
met and surpassed, and the nation emerged stronger for it. 
It was also a time of hope. In 1962, Dr. M.S. Swaminathan, then 
of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute, had taken the lead in 
bringing to India strains of the dwarf wheat varieties developed in 
Mexico by Dr. Norman Borlaug. By 1965, selections made at the 
IARI and the Punjab Agricultural University from these strains were 
being tested throughout India under experimental trials coordinated 
by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research. The field trials of 
these new strains produced more than double, sometimes triple, pre-
viously attained experimental yields. Through the work of plant 
breeders in Madras a new variety of high yielding rice became avail-
able to South Indian farmers, and from the recently opened Interna-
tional Rice Research Institute, came strains of dwarf rice with yield 
response similar to wheat. All these new biological strains were sub-
jected to further test and selections by ICAR scientists. A visit to the 
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crop research stations of the country between 1965 and 1967 pro-
vided a startling contrast to the surrounding areas. In the midst of the 
worst national food crisis in two decades, the experimental plots were 
heavy with dense foliage and close-packed heads of grain. Here 
surely a hope of abundance amid the despair of want. 
In early 1966, the Minister of Food and Agriculture, Mr. C. 
Subramaniam, boldly gambled on the research results and commit-
ted $5.0 million of the nation's scarce foreign exchange to purchase 
up to 20,000 tonnes of dwarf wheat from Mexico to be used as seed 
on Indian farms. The 'action was truly bold for reasons important to 
our story, and I want to dwell on some aspects of these. 
In effect, the Minister gave official support to implementing a 
technological solution to the country's sluggish agriculture, a solution 
that would entail a major change in the national farm economy for 
the new varieties required non-farm inputs of fertilizer to reach their 
yield potential. It was an unexpected solution, little covered in the 
catalogues of proposals assembled from rural development special-
ists. It was a solution that earned hostility at the time it was made, 
and since then to the present. For some, it bypassed the problems and 
claimed needs of cultural, social, economic and political rural reform. 
For others, it opened the way to alien models of the agricultural 
economy. It was argued that applying modern farm technologies held 
the potential of strengthening capitalistic agriculture and, as a result, 
would benefit mainly rich, large farmers, that such technologies 
would open the way to large-scale commercial farm enterprises with 
consequent effects on small farmers and rural employment, that they 
would benefit areas that possessed irrigation facilities and a good 
infrastructure of farm services to the relative detriment of those 
living in more backward or less well endowed parts of the country. 
And, perhaps most interesting of all in a country in the depths of a 
famine and where most of the food output is directly consumed by 
those who produce it, that if the technologies were successful in 
raising output, it would sap the political will of the nation to imple-
ment reforms and might even bring the problems of surplus food 
supplies, opening to India all the farm problems of the industrial 
nations. Obviously, many of these concerns were valid, but it was 
wrong to use them as an argument for not moving along the one 
avenue that held evident hope for food sufficiency. Indeed, on one 
occasion, I saw Mr. Subramaniam sit patiently through the recital of 
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a long litany of reasons for persevering with a more vigorous imple-
mentation of the approaches of the Second and Third Plans to agri-
cultural development, with the enjoinder that other avenues should 
not be opened or pursued. His response was simply to ask: "How do I 
feed our people? What hope have you offered me that I can pass to 
them?" It took an unusual brand of courage to persist along an 
untried path. 
The second element of boldness in the decision was the belief 
that farmers would adopt the n_ew varieties of grain if they were 
proven more productive. Not only were millions of farmers expected 
to change the varieties they plant, but also the cultural practices they 
follow in their farm operations including the use of cash to purchase 
inputs, especially fertilizer, and increased amounts of irrigation 
water. To my knowledge, only a few brave souls dared argue that the 
Indian farmer would innovate if the economic return warranted the 
expense and the risk. For most who applauded the decision to import 
the seed supply from Mexico, the hands were clapped with crossed 
fingers. 
The third element of uncertainty that made the decision bold 
was greatest of all. The new wheat and rice varieties depended for 
their high yields upon large inputs of plant nutrient, particularly 
nitrogen. India's own production of this vital input was small. The 
timetable called for the imported seeds to be multiplied in the winter 
of 1967 so that enough seed for widespread farm use would be 
available in 1968. It left no time to build the fertilizer plants neces-
sary to meet the demands of a large acreage in dwarf wheat two years 
hence. In 1966, except for concessional food aid (and even this was 
unsure), the inflow of foreign assistance to India depended more on 
the whim of U.S. President Lyndon Johnson than upon any rational 
assessment of the country's needs. Yet, by one projection, if the dwarf 
wheat seed did find a wide acceptance, 1968 fertilizer imports would 
have to climb from a few tens of millions of dollars to close to $250 
million. This could only be met through foreign assistance. And 
because most external aid agencies were then reluctant to provide 
assistance resources for annual consumables, the task of assuring the 
innovative farmer of the production requisites he required to capture 
the yield potential of the new plant materials was much more difficult 
than dealing with a recalcitrant and mercurial U.S. President. 
And then there were the myriad administrative problems to be 
overcome within the Indian rural development bureaucracy. The 
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demonstration plots had to be laid out, the credit channels opened, 
the fertilizer distributed, the irrigation water supplied, and so on. 
The promise that shone from the experimental plots in 1965 
demanded the modernization of the nation's agriculture if it was to 
bear fruit. It was a bold decision, indeed. 
It paid off. It was the beginning of what the news media chris-
tened a "Green Revolution". In the rabi season of 1968, Indian 
wheat farmers produced 16.5 million tonnes of foodgrain, a third 
more than ever before. Within two more years, national wheat pro-
duction was double the average of the early sixties. The Indian 
farmer proved to be not only innovative, but also eager to modernize 
his operation. Fertilizer imports in 1968 rose to roughly $280 mil-
lion, most of it received under foreign assistance arrangements. The 
rural bureaucracy proved equal to its task as research scientists, 
extension officers, irrigation engineers, electricity board officials, co-
operatives personnel, and everyone else around were melded into 
functioning units to support the spread of new agricultural practices. 
A task superbly managed by the Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. B. 
Sivaraman. By the end of 1968, it was obvious that some parts of 
rural India were caught up in a new dynamic. The hope was becom-
ing a reality. The despair of the drought years was broken with a new 
vision of verdant fields of blue-green, nitrogen-rich plants. 
Because the nature of this transformation is vital to what fol-
lows, I would like to pause and reflect a little on its nature and the 
circumstances of its course. 
The first and most obvious element was the contribution of the 
new varietal material itself. Traditional Indian varieties had been 
selected by farmers and bred by scientists to survive under the diffi-
cult production conditions of the older farming patterns. The at-
tempts of the Package Programme to encourage the use of fertilizer 
in the early sixties failed because traditional varieties, when fed a 
rich nutrient, either did not respond in yield because of a heavy early 
vegetative growth and lodging, or responded only marginally, yield-
ing about ten pounds of extra grain. per pound of added nitrogen. 
The new varieties were bred for a modern, high-production environ-
ment. They required careful and frequent waterings, and they could 
absorb large amounts of nutrient without faltering in their yields. 
Added grain went as high as 25 pounds per pound of additional 
nitrogen. With the new nutrient-responsive varieties, the Indian 
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farmer had, for the first time, the element missing in the production 
"package" pressed with little avail in older development pro-
grammes. When the technological promise of this integrated set of 
production practices was demonstrated, farmers were interested. The 
increased yields were obvious from even a cursory examination of 
trial plots and when farmers shared their experiences among them-
selves, the new practices became as well known as the new varieties. 
The varieties emerged from research in both Mexico and India. 
Until the dwarf wheat tests in the early sixties, Indian research was 
guided by the belief that advances in Indian food agriculture would 
come from within the framework of traditional farming. Applica-
tions. of high nutrient levels made sense in commercial cash crops 
such as cotton and tobacco, but, in common with most Indian econo-
mists and planners of the time, researchers did not envisage as a food 
agriculture based on fertilizer use, high levels of irrigation, and 
modern methods of pest and pathogen control. Thus, research focus-
sed on yield improvement under traditionally low nutrient regimes, 
low moisture levels, strong competition from other plants and the 
depredations of diseases and destructive parasites. Thus, the decision 
to undertake research into high-yield crops based on production 
requisites not yet a part of India's rural economy - was a major 
departure from an older research philosophy. 
The rapid spread of the new practices among farmers should lay 
to rest the vision of the Indian agriculturist as a stubborn, changeless 
robot slavishly following his inherited agricultural traditions. I have 
a particular pique with the too often repeated cliche that "What can 
you expect? They have been doing it for a thousand years, and why 
should they change now?" I have yet to meet a thousand-year-old 
farmer, and I can think of many reasons why farmers of any age 
might wish to change if new methods are more efficient and profit-
able. And therein lies another key. The new varieties were profitable. 
Adopters found modern wheat farming most rewarding. The price 
increase for grain in the famine years was given extra leverage by a 
price decline in nitrogen fertilizer resulting from new techniques of 
manufacture. In the early part of the decade, it required about seven 
kilos of wheat to buy one kilo of nitrogen considering risk, it was 
hardly an attractive proposition when the kilo of nitrogen would add 
only about ten kilos of grain to output. By 1968, however, it required 
roughly three kilos of wheat to buy a kilo of nitrogen a most 
attractive proposition when the new varieties yielded up to 20 kilos 
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of extra grain for the three spent on nutrient. It was the engine of 
profit opportunity that drove the innovative dynamic of the 
countryside. 
The modernization of Indian farming in 1968 was evident in 
only a few parts of the country. Technical limitations held farming 
static in most of the unaffected areas. Lack of assured irrigation was 
the most critical constraint in North and Central India, and unsuit-
ability to wheat production left other areas isolated from the oppor-
tunity to adopt. For many reasons, the dwarf rice varieties available 
had little adaptability to Indian conditions - a phenomenon that is 
slowly yielding to intensified research on rice - and the rice story is 
still some years from paralleling the experience in wheat. Advances 
in sorghum and millet are probably further behind. It is the lesson 
from wheat that set the perspective for what is to come. 
The expansion in wheat output began mainly in the Punjab, 
Haryana and Western Uttar Pradesh. These areas were endowed 
with good access to irrigation; were equipped with good transporta-
tion systems; and, by the standards of rural India, had an excellent 
network of private and public agencies to serve the farm community 
with the factor outlets and product markets necessary to initiate and 
sustain support for the transition to a modern agriculture. In part, the 
legacy of twenty years of rural development activities set the founda-
tions for what was to come. It was the organization and ready re-
sponse to changing needs by the farm services enterprises and public 
agencies, including the district officers and development personnel, 
that permitted cultivators in these regions to adopt successfully the 
new technologies of production. 
Wheat growing is particularly suited to individual decision-
making. And so it was with the spread and adoption of new varieties 
and changed practices. One farmer, almost with reference to his 
neighbour, could plant dwarf strains, add fertilizer, and, as long as he 
could control the irrigation of his land according to his need, he 
could harvest the fruits of his enterprise. But the individual decision 
was heavily dependent on an assured flow of production supplies: 
seed, fertilizer, water, even hired labour. Thus, the capacity and 
responsiveness of the network providing farm services is as crucial to 
facilitating innovations as the excellence of the technical package and 
a high economic incentive. The true measure of the growth in wheat 
output is to be found in the articulation effected under Government 
supervision that brought together the research scientist, the extension 
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workers, the industries, and dealers supplying farm requisites (in-
cluding help from foreign assistance agencies), the marketing agents, 
the credit sources, and others, while holding economic incentives to 
the favour of the farming entrepreneur. 
The three-year period 1965 to 1968 - began with the despair 
famine and ended with the solid evidence that the sornnabulant 
national agriculture could be aroused and vitalized, and made a 
major contributor to the national destiny. Hope rode high in 1968. 
And too soon, the lessons of twenty years were forgotten. 
III. 1969 to 1974: Triumph and Stagnation 
,Wheat production continued to rise from 1968 to the present, 
faltering only in the drought of 1972-73 when electricity, diesel fuel, 
and fertilizer shortages left gaps in the available supplies of water 
and nutrient. Between 1968 and 1972, wheat output grew at the rate 
of 12.6 percent per year as both yield and area increased in about 
equal proportions. It is a popular myth that wheat displaced gram, a 
matter of significance because of the importance of gram as a protein 
source. Actually, wheat mainly displaced barley in farmland alloca-
tions a more sensible substitution since both compete closely for 
irrigation water. 
But, overall, the wheat story remained the only tale really worth 
teliing. Rice output continued to rise but at a rate of only 3.2 percent 
per year - not appreciably higher than the rate attained in the Third 
Plan period of the early sixties. Total foodgrain production between 
1967-68 and 1971-72 rose by over three percent per year, but when 
wheat is excluded, the rate drops below one percent per annum. 
Indeed, if wheat and rice are both excluded, total output of the 
remaining foodgrains falls by almost 1.4 percent per year; in part, a 
phenomenon explained by an increased allocation of the better en-
dowed acreage to wheat, but in part also a reflection of the unique-
ness of the wheat experience. 
Yet, it was from the growth in wheat output that the nation was 
able to build a substantial buffer stock and reverse the upward trend 
of grain prices begun in the early sixties. Prices fell in I 969 by 12 
percent and remained below the levels set in the famine years of the 
sixties until the drought of 1972-73 started the upward march again 
- this time in lockstep with a worldwide inflation first in grain 
prices, then in oil and industrial products. 
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The period 1967-68 to 1974-75 looks depressingly similar to the 
period of 1953-54 to 1963-64. As in the earlier period, production 
grew at an overall rate not significantly different from zero. And, 
again, the period embraced a drought year that cast severe doubt on 
the soundness of the agricultural policies being pursued by the 
Government. 
The so-called "Green Revolution" had always been a target of 
scholarly opposition. The production increases were seen as giving 
rise to new sets of problems promptly dubbed "second" and "third" 
generation difficulties. The social consequences of agricultural mod-
ernization were embraced in the "second" generation set, and the 
consequences of farm surpluses in the "third" set. For some of us 
who watched closely, the issues still demanding attention were the 
"first" generation difficulties of how to sustain and extend the mod-
ernization process. By 1973, it was clear that the farm dynamic 
begun in 1968 was no longer the driving force it had once been. A 
revolution in rice production similar to that in wheat did not (and 
has not) materialized; sorghum and millet have been affected hardly 
at all. 
During the years of dynamic output change between 1968 and 
1972, it became popular in some quarters, in both India and abroad, 
to argue that the problem of assuring the nation's food supply was 
solved, and attention should again turn to industrial growth. Some 
who espoused this view joined others in playing the familiar themes 
of rural reform, now with added variations of concern that the tech-
nologically based change in the farming economy would make re-
form more difficult because it added to land values and gave further 
power to the entrenched social elite of the countryside. Indeed, who 
really benefited from the higher-output agriculture became an inter-
national cause ce/ebre among social scholars and self-appointed pro-
tectionists of various social and __ economic interests. Added to the 
battle of words and writings at this time were the ecologists who 
worried about everything - from fertilizer and pesticide use to the 
large areas of land being sown to the new grains because of poten-
tially hazardous disease conditions (a factor already being closely 
watched by Indian scientists). 
Many, if not all, of these arguments had important elements of 
truth. At first, it was the larger farmer who could afford the risk of 
experimentation and thereby reaped the early innovator's rent, but 
evidence soon indicated that the smaller farmer was not far behind in 
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the adoption cycle once the c~sts of learning had been paid and risks 
reduced. It is true that there are ecological and environmental conse-
quences of non-traditional technologies, and we need to know more 
about these. The pause in planning in the mid-sixties did slow Indian 
industrial investment and it needed to recover if only because the 
new agricultural technologies required a large industrial base for 
their support - a base not envisaged in earlier plans. 
In recalling this phase, it is well to remember that in 1968 
Indian agricultural growth rested on the three legs of a new crop 
production technology, economic incentives for its adoption, and an 
infrastructure to deliver the necessary off-farm services to innovating 
cultivators. Farmers responded to these three elements insofar as it 
was possible to do so by personal, individual decisions. The first 
limitation to this decision-making was the supply of water for irri-
gation. Cultivators who could, responded by sinking their own small 
wells and pressuring State authorities for an electricity supply to 
power their pumps. Where electricity was not available and ground-
water was, diesel pumps were installed. Between 1968 and 1974, the 
estimated number of electric and diesel pumps in use more than 
doubled - from under two million to well over four million. Private 
investment in groundwater irrigation far outstripped public expendi-
tures in the same period. Irrigation investments by individual farm-
ers, however, could effectively be made only in those areas with 
relatively high groundwater tables and free-flowing, rapid recharge 
aquifers - a boon to the Ganges plain and particularly to the light 
soil regions of Northwestern India already endowed with canals and 
public tube wells. Even those lucky enough to be able to exploit 
irrigation opportunities could not, by themselves, insure the electric 
supply, or the timely availability of diesel oil, or of fertilizers, or of 
credit, or of superior seed. In time, and as more cultivators became 
participants in the newly emerging farm economy, the pressure on 
the supply of off-farm production factors began to approach the 
capacity of the nation's industries, public utilities, and Government 
services to deliver the needed support. 
The difficulties were most apparent in fertilizers. The Indian 
fertilizer industry has long been a football among political ideo-
logues. To build or not to build the industry; and if to build: who 
should do it and under what terms? The debates are important to 
striking a national political posture, but they are time-consuming 
and they have resulted in a diminution of service support for the 
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growth of food output. In the early seventies, a State Chief Minister 
pointed out to me that, at the farm level, fertilizer was "no longer a 
mere factor of production it is now a political commodity!" And it 
was an economic one, too. An uncontrolled fertilizer market had 
grown beside the official one. In early 197 4, official prices for nitro-
gen were between Rs. 2.20 and Rs. 3.25 per kilo, depending on its 
form; the uncontrolled market ran 40 to 50 percent higher at 
between Rs. 3.20 and Rs. 5.40 per kilo. 
There are many ramifications in the fertilizer story that need not 
concern us here. It is sufficient to say, that from 1968 to the present, 
Government policy, or rather the lack of it, has left the nation's 
farmers, and thereby its consumers, vulnerable to nutrient supply 
vagaries that have hobbled the course of agricultural development. 
These vagaries have had two effects. The most obvious one was 
to disrupt farm production plans by unavailabilities, or to lower 
yields because of shortfalls in applied amounts. The second effect was 
the less evident impact on profitability. It is too early for a definitive 
study of the effect of fertilizer use from changes in the relative prices 
of grain and nutrient. Using data from 1953-54 to 1972-73, my 
colleague, Dr. M.S. Rao, has calculated that.a one percent change in 
relative prices will result in a one percent drop in fertilizer use. Since 
1968, the movement in the ratio of official fertilizer-grain prices has 
been somewhat erratic, and its swings have been probably accentu-
ated in the unofficial markets. The result cannot be other than a 
slowdown in the adoption of new varieties and a cutback in yield due 
to lower fertilizer use. Particularly worrisome was the 20 percent 
change in the price ratios between 1974 and 1975 when the price of 
fertilizer was allowed to rise at a faster rate than the returns from 
grain production. This will slow a rising demand for nutrient, but it 
will have a longer-term adverse effect on the modernization of farm-
ing and on the subsequent availability of food supplies. 
A.somewhat different story holds for the other critical input to 
modern farming: water for irrigation. No doubt the steady progress 
of rural electrification will generate a continued expansion in private 
investment in farm pump sets. But the areas where groundwater 
exploitation is easy are nearing a limit and further expansion in 
irrigation will necessitate even larger public investments. Until re-
cently, Indian irrigation development focussed on large dam reser-
voirs and canal distribution systems - most designed on the British 
model to deliver small amounts of water to large areas as a drought 
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protection measure. Modern farming technologies demand a new 
principle of water allocation. Well fertilized new varieties require 
three to five times the amount of water needed to insure the minimal 
yield of traditional seed strains. This fact explains why so many 
farmers served by canal systems found it profitable - even necessary 
to install their own pump facilities. In the years hence the nation 
must allocate large investments for irrigation systems capable of 
serving a high-productivity agriculture. It will mean the re-designing 
of old systems, the combining of surface water with sub-surface 
pumping and the construction of new field channels and drains to 
give each farmer a significant measure of control over the flow of 
water to his particular plots. To make it all effective, fields will have 
to be consolidated, shaped and levelled to proper slopes, and ade-
quately protected from erosion, salinity and water-logging. 
One of the more disturbing aspects of the past few years is a 
relative stagnation in research. The wheat breakthrough in the late 
sixties was presaged on the research plots in the early sixties. In 1975 
there were no comparable harbingers of the shape of national agri-
culture five years ahead. Punjab farmers are now complaining of a 
stagnation in yields. In this India is not alone. The revolution in 
farming methods that began in 1968 served merely to bring India 
and other countries bordering the tropics onto a yield par with 
temperate-country agricultures. Today, on research stations 
throughout the world, wheat has hit a yield plateau. But for India, the 
future research breakthrough must be in rice and while notable ad-
vances have been made in improving this crop through the ICAR 's 
All-India Coordinated Rice Improvement Programme, efforts still 
fall short of what is needed to bring national rice production into line 
with that of wheat. I know something of the many pressures on the 
ICAR executive officers as they strive to develop a national agricul-
tural research agenda, but, as I put the nation's food production into 
an historical perspective, I cannot help but wonder if the research 
agenda and resource allocations have given adequate weight to the 
necessity of expanding rice output over the next decade. The modern-
ization of the nation's infrastructural support of farming, such as 
irrigation and road networks, will take time to implement and yield 
results. Only a significant transformation of the nation's rice econ-
omy can fill the gap between the "then" and "now". 
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In looking back, I think there is clear evidence that, if the ingre-
dients of the "Green Revolution's" technology, incentives, and sup-
port services are sustained and advanced, the nation's farmers will 
respond and output will grow. It was unthinkable ten years ago for 
West Bengal to be a wheat producer; now it grows a million or more 
hectares; Eastern U ttar Pradesh was a "backward" area in fifty years 
of official documents, today it is a thriving farm region clamouring 
for electricity, roads, fertilizer, and processing plants and markets. 
The story, in one form or another, is repeated across most of North 
India and into many parts of the Deccan. But it has not touched all of 
India's rural areas, nor has the course of change been sustained in 
many of the regions where it was pioneered. Indeed, a confusion of 
policies and a reluctance to push with vigour large private and public 
investment into the appurtenances of support for a modern agricul-
ture slowly turned the triumph of the late sixties into a stagnation of 
the early seventies. Even this year's promise of 114 to 115 million 
tonnes of output is five million tonnes short of what should have been 
- if the nation had enjoyed a three percent growth rate from 1967-
68 to the present a little below the rate of demand growth at 
constant prices. In the overall, the total gap between these trends over 
the past eight years is more than 45 million tonnes. 
In this perspective, the "Green Revolution" seems to be a one-
time event that shifted the nation's productive curve upward by 
about 20 million tonr~es. And, in fact, this will be the case if the 
ingredients of its beginning are neglected in the future. It will be 
otherwise if the lessons are learned and applied. The oft expressed 
political will that India use its bountiful resources of water, sunlight, 
soil, and climate to feed itself must be accompanied by the political 
action necessary to build the programmes of sustained support for 
the country's farmers. They have already demonstrated their eager-
ness to become full partners in national economic uplift, they hold 
and work a land resource that has the greatest potential in the world 
to produce food, and if made partners in national development, they 
can give the nation a food abundance greater than any of us has 
dreamed. 
IV. 1975 Onward: Self-Sufficiency and Exports 
In 1972, a worldwide drought reduced known stocks of food 
from a world supply of roughly 90 days to less than 35 days. The 
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harvests in the years following have been able only to add a few days 
to world reserve stocks, and the 1975 poor crop in the Soviet Union 
will likely drive available stocks to below 30 days. This is one index 
of world food security, or, better, insecurity. It was the Russian 
purchases of 1972 that triggered a worldwide food inflation and set 
the rationale for the oil price increases of 1973. Indeed, the instabil-
ity of Soviet agriculture must now be viewed as a major factor in any 
consideration of India's prospects of feeding its peoples. North 
American, and primarily U.S., farms now account for the supply to 
over 90 percent of the world's grain trade. And the bins that held 
almost three months of world requirements in 1965 can no longer be 
relied upon to meet a short-term crisis of the size experienced in 
India in the mid-sixties. In fact, it is doubtful if they can ever be 
relied upon again. Food demand in the Soviet Union is increasing as 
its citizens seek diets richer in animal products. Observers of the 
organizational difficulties and climatic vulnerability of the Soviet 
farm economy are frankly sceptical of the continuing ability of Rus-
sian farmers to provide an assured domestic supply of food. The 
large variation in recent world grain transactions induced by the ups 
and downs of the Russian harvest may be stabilized somewhat by the 
long-term purchase agreements the U.S.S.R. will likely sign with the 
U.S. and Canada; but with the best will in the world to support the 
emergency food needs of countries like India, the prospects for long-
term commercial sales of food from North America may, and likely 
will, cause future emergency aid to be drawn from the leftovers. 
If there is a world food problem today in the sense of a world 
concern for hungry people, India is the centre of that problem. The 
few millions living in Africa's Sahel are difficult to succour in times 
of drought not because they bite deeply into stocks, but because 
moving food to them is hampered by grossly inadequate transport 
facilities. Even the masses of your Asian neighbours could be greatly 
helped through a period of crop failure by relatively small supplies 
when compared to this country's needs for a population of over 600 
million. Contrast the approximately nine million tonnes of grain 
shifted to India in the years 1966 and 1967 - about five percent 
(each year) of the then annual world reserves - with what would be 
needed today for a similar proportionate support of domestic con-
sumption. This was enough grain to feed 65 million people at aver-
age consumption levels - about 13 percent of the total population. 
Today, a similar percentage of the population, or 79 million people, 
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would require over 12 million tonnes of grain about 11 percent of 
the world grain reserves held during the past two years. When people 
talk of the fear of famine in the world, it is India that looms largest. 
And for no reason when viewed against the nation's production 
potential. I am fearful that two successive years of drought like those 
of the mid-sixties or of 1972-73 will find neither this nation nor the 
world c;:ommunity at large able to stay the awesome hand of famine. 
If this is permitted to come to pass the cause will be the neglect 
of this nation to exploit for itself its vast human and geographic 
potential to produce food. The sunlight energy for the production of 
plant materials, the rainfall for recharging both surface and under-
ground reservoirs, the huge areas of soils responsive to management, 
the large and thriving scientific establishment, and above all, the vast 
number of skilled, capable and innovative farmers are the assets 
needed to make this nation a major net contributor to the world food 
supplies. That almost 30 years after political independence India has 
not become food independent borders on being a national shame. 
Unless food independence is pressed with the same vigour as the 
fight for political independence, India will never attain the full sover-
eignty that its endowments can and should ensure. 
The gap to self-sufficiency is not large. Net grain imports over 
the past decades have averaged less than five percent of domestic 
production. In terms of the increased productivity of a fertilized and 
irrigated hectare over one that is farmed by traditional methods, the 
present gap is equal to the output from l.5 million hectares, an area 
less than one percent of the nation's total cropped land. A carefully 
implemented extension of modern methods of farming to an addi-
tional few million hectares each year would assure not only closing 
the import gap, but of remaining abreast of the demand for food as it 
rises in response to the inexorable pressures of population increase 
and the desire for better diets that results from the growth of national 
personal income. Simple projections of various trend assumptions 
between now and 1985 would suggest that unless population growth 
is lowered dramatically or national income growth is virtually stag-
nant, the gap between the domestic production and domestic demand 
will, at best, remain at about five percent, the size of the gap growing 
absolutely from about five million tonnes to over seven million 
tonnes. In fact, the real prospects for India as it looks ahead is either 
to accelerate the development of its national food production poten-
tial, or to enter the world's commercial grain market and seek to 
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assure a long-term supply through appropriate forward contracts. To 
me the latter proposition is ludicrous when placed against the im-
mense untapped farm potential of the nation. 
The cocktail circuit talk in some national and international cir-
cles has taken to reviewing world economic development as being 
analogous to a lifeboat. Briefly, the analogy focuses on sea disaster 
where a single lifeboat is launched but with a space too limited to 
welcome all who seek to come aboard, thus choices must be made 
about who to save and who to abandon. In the talk, world resources, 
and particularly food supplies are equated with the space available 
on the lifeboat; who is worthy of saving is the point of the conversa-
tion. India, along with some of its neighbours in South Asia is seldom 
considered a candidate for salvation. 
I do not want to dwell too long on a game played by the well-fed. 
It is a contemptuous exercise devoid of humanity and humility that 
engages only the arrogant who are ignorant. But there is a point to be 
marked from it, however distasteful both the exercise and the point 
may be. The point arises from the generally accepted criteria that 
those worthy of salvation are those who have exhibited a greater 
vigour of self-help and made the larger effort to realize their own 
potential. These are the ones for whom the lifeboat is seen as a bridge 
to a self-sufficient future. By this measure, India's continued food 
difficulties despite its agricultural potential, place it among the candi-
dates for abandonment. No more than a pique to pride to be sure. 
But it is a reflection of how others view this nation's post-Indepen-
dence agricultural history. A reflection that may find wider currency 
becoming an element in the policies of other countries should the 
years ahead find food supplies inadequate for global needs. 
All the signs now apparent in world agriculture point to a fore-
seeable future that is unlikely to enjoy luxurious food indulgences of 
the past quarter century. The product of the enterprise of North 
American farmers will probably not be found in the stored abun-
dance of five years ago. This nation must recognize that its only true 
secure food supplies are those found within its borders; that its 
credibility as a national power rests ultimately upon its capacity to 
feed its population; and that if its agricultural policies are drawn to 
match and realize its productive potential, it can and will emerge as 
one of the world's great suppliers of man's daily bread. 
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V. A Prospect 
If stated intent could give sustenance, India's last 20 years could 
feed the world. The massive output of the nation's official presses, the 
rhetoric of the politicians, and the hours its planners and bureaucrats 
have spent talking and writing about the need to develop the nation's 
agriculture leave no doubt about the will to transform its agricultural 
base. Yet the result has not equalled the intent. In this overview I 
have touched in a sketchy fashion on the many forms of action the 
intent has taken and on why I believe some failed and some were 
successful. Only in the past eight years has a segment of the country's 
agriculture shown a dynamic equal to that pictured in the writings 
and speeches about national development. Today there is early ev-
idence that the sources of this recent dynamic are in danger of being 
disregarded, and the drive toward transformation may be sapped 
instead of sustained, confined instead of spread. If this is so, the 
nation will remain enthralled by the vagaries of rain bearing winds 
and the movement of international grain markets and prices. The 
same factors that irretrievably reduced the foreign exchange balances 
required to attain the expected accomplishments in each plan period 
since 1955. 
I want to close my lecture by touching on a few of the points I 
believe emerge as lessons from a perspective of the nation's post-
Independence agricultural experience. 
I believe the greatest present danger to India's farm progress is 
the wavering and uncertain focus of its national agricultural policies. 
No one disputes the evidence of the strong political will to foster 
agricultural growth. But political will without organized, sustained 
and purposeful political action avails of little. The record reveals that, 
except for a few years at the end of the sixties, political action of this 
kind has been less than adequate. 
A significant feature oflndia 's agricultural development policies 
has been a confusion of program purposes with many labelled as 
undertakings to foster development being designed in reality to pro-
mote the welfare of agriculturists and the rural people rather than the 
growth of agricultural output. The two goals are not synonymous; 
each in its own right is a national purpose worthy of separate pursuit. 
It becomes counterproductive if the aims are fused and pursued as if 
they were or could be a single goal. Assistance to low income farmers, 
to drought areas, to landless families, to improving the well-being of 
small cultivators, etc., are programs that need no justification beyond 
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the goal of helping poor people. To place these activities under the 
heading of agricultural development and to divert resources to them 
from the allocations earmarked for efforts to foster agricultural 
growth is to misunderstand the separate nature of each purpose. 
Welfare programs contribute little to the longterm capacity of the 
nation to produce food and fibre. Their goal is to distribute more 
equitably the nation's economic product and social and economic 
opportunity. Their accomplishments are properly measured in these 
and not productive terms. Why not call them what they are and be 
proud of what they do? In fact in the final analysis a case can be 
made for placing their execution under a separate Ministry so that 
confusion is avoided and the officers concerned with each activity 
know precisely the purposes they are to accomplish. 
The development of Indian agricultural productivity is the gar-
gantuan task of mobilizing and extracting from the nation's geo-
graphic and human resources the product needed to secure the wel-
fare of the nation as a whole. It must be pursued with the purpose of 
building within the country a capacity to produce food and fibre that 
will meet national requirements regardless of what the rain-bearing 
winds may bring. The policies to bring this about must recognize that 
the national interest is paramount. Regional and sectional interests 
must not be permitted to hobble the efforts to insure food for all. 
Their valid concerns should be met through other programs. To 
transform a traditional, agrarian social and technological structure 
into a modern farm society with all the apparatus of factor and 
product markets, public services and industrial support requires huge 
capital expenditures that must be met with a cold eye to maximizing 
the comparative returns to the nation. The history oflndia's agricul-
tural development investment indicates that such a cold eye has too 
infrequently attended the accounting of the expenditures made. 
The experience of the late sixties sets the policy guides for the 
future. It begins with research and a focussing of research endeavours 
on the priority needs of national food production. Research scientists 
must guard against trying to do too much or to embrace all problems 
at once. The focus of national research must not be so diffused as to 
make impossible the hard effort required for discovery. It is always 
possible to defend additions to a research agenda. Resisting the 
temptation to add new programs is the hardest task of a research 
management that strives to find and hold priorities. Research topics 
should not be dictated by immediate fashions of thought, they must 
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be derived from a continuous careful assessment of the nation's 
persisting needs. 
India is unique among developing nations for the number and 
excellence of its agricultural scientists. But the quality of its human 
resources is far from matched by the size and quality of the physical 
research facilities available to employ to best advantage this pool of 
talent. An early investment in laboratories, equipment, field plots and 
libraries is required if the Indian scientific establishment is to be fully 
used to provide the advances in knowledge that must underpin future 
agricultural development. 
Sound research results are a first requirement for modernizing 
agriculture. But farmers will not adopt more productive and techni-
cally superior methods unless they are also economically profitable. 
Much has been written about the economics of India's farming. 
Most of it reduces to the simple fact that, whether for small or large 
farms, the prices of added farm inputs relative to the added returns 
from their use (all adjusted for risk) determines in India as in other 
market economies, the margins of profit from modern farm methods. 
These, in turn, determine whether new farm production technologies 
are adopted or rejected. At the time of declining farm prices it is well 
to keep this single element in mind. Its neglect will not only stifle 
innovation but may well reverse advances already underway. I shall 
return to this theme later. 
Once the technology is proven and profitable to apply, the 
farmer can only act if he is at the end of a functioning supply line of 
production requisites. Non-traditional, high-yield agriculture de-
mands non-traditional farm inputs. High plant population per unit 
of area requires heavy dosages of nutrient and water; high plant 
populations need insect and disease protection; rapidly maturing 
varieties open opportunities for multiple and sequential cropping of 
the same land often demanding a close timing of farm operations 
capable of being met only by mechanical power units that are more 
efficient than animal power. 
It seems characteristic of agricultural development, however, for 
scholars and others involved in policies to resist or to agree lengthily 
about just how much is needed from non-farm sectors to foster mod-
ern farming. Somehow the list of requirements to support the opera-
tion of a modern steel industry is accepted with only complaints 
about its costliness. This is not so for the food production industry. 
There is a powerful and deep-seated belief that a modern agricultural 
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industry should be able to get along with less, much less from extra-
rural economic activity. It cannot. Modern farm technology is a 
whole cloth. It is greater by far than the sum of its parts. If rent into 
selected pieces, its productivity drops drastically. High yields need 
high application of plant food. Nutrients in the amounts required 
call for modern fertilizers - green .manures will not suffice - which 
in turn calls for all the assorted elements of industrial support. Just as 
high-yield farm technology is indivisible, the infrastructure needed 
for its support is a comprehensive whole. In India today, the moder-
nity of a village as measured by its agricultural output is directly 
related to whether it is served with electric power and its proximity 
to a serviceable road. If the food problem is to be solved, it is invest-
ment in the infrastructure of support for modern farming that must 
command a lion's share of the nation's resources for rural develop-
ment. There is no cheap road to food abundance. But a caution is 
due. Electric lines, roads, credit facilities, extension officers, fertilizer 
markets, storage depots will not make an iota of difference unless 
there are profitable, high-yield technologies to be extended to the 
farmers. This is the major lesson from the Community Development 
movement and the IADP. Infrastructural investment will be produc-
tive only in those areas where the unavailability of suitable farm 
services has blocked the spread of innovative farm practices. In some 
of the areas voluntary village improvement programs of the kind 
espoused by the Community Development movement might provide 
a ready method of building the rural civil works of such support. 
I will not go into greater details of the infrastructural needs. The 
glaring areas of lagging investment in fertilizer capacity, in modern 
methods of water exploitation and management from reservoir to 
farmer's field, in road construction, in transport, in storage are part 
of the litany oflndia 's development problems. But I do want to touch 
on one aspect that has received special attention recently, that is, 
credit for agricultural production. Indian rural credit institutions 
have had a long history of innovation and experiment. One element 
in this history has been a desire to find a single pattern of providing 
rural credit that will fit the needs of all. I think the experience to date 
demonstrates that no one pattern will suffice. India's diversity of 
geography and farm potential demands that farmers be able to select 
from a broad spectrum of amounts, terms, rates, and even risk insur-
ances. The credit needs of small farmers are very different from those 
of large land-owners. And the greater risks of rice farming require 
26 
quite different credit arrangements from those offered to wheat grow-
ers. In credit as in so much in agricultural development, the attempt 
to treat everybody equally will end in treating all ineffectively. Until 
credit agencies undertake to provide a divergent range of services 
geared to the separate needs of each borrower, the nation's credit 
structure will remain inadequate to its mission. 
One final comment on infrastructure. A sustained investment 
focussed on creating a comprehensive integrated pattern of modern 
services for the farmers of a region seems to have the happy conse-
quence of permanently increasing the capacity of that region to 
produce food and fibre. In economic terms it shifts the supply curve 
to the right so that even with lower prices or profitability production 
will not decline to previous levels. A case in point is the recent 
experience of Northwestern India where, despite a lack of irrigation 
water and an early shortage of fertilizer, output remained. high, 
holding the nation's 1975 rabi harvest to almost record levels. In a 
real sense, the investments made in modern wheat agriculture are 
true contributors to the nation's secure food supply. In the same 
sense, Indian planners would do well to set output targets not for 
years of average weather conditions, but for a level that would be 
attained as the minimum secured base in a year of adverse rainfall. 
In other words, planning for minimum needs in times of weather 
stress, not for projected needs if the weather plays fair and thereby, 
leaving the nation on the import lists or facing a food price inflation 
if the weather fails. Planning for a secure food output is possible; the 
key is a careful attention to the appropriate infrastructure invest-
ments, and to the circumstances for fostering innovation among 
cultivators. 
The development of agriculture in this country still must trav-
erse a long and difficult road. Neither the Indian farmer nor the 
many institutions engaged in his support can afford to journey far 
along the road if the map and rules of movement seem subject to 
frequent and unpredictable change. The immensity of the task de-
mands that development efforts be purposeful and sustained over 
many years. There is not a discernible long-term strategy for India's 
agricultural development and even the administration of the shorter-
term tactics outlined in each Plan has an ad hoc, chop and change air 
about it. It appears that, after each good harvest the temptation is to 
forget the urgency of rural development. The impetus for early deci-
sion is lost and complacency about food production stalks the halls of 
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Governments as officers congratulate each other. Expenditures lag 
and older plans are scrapped or delayed or set aside for another day. 
After each poor harvest or threat of it, the funds that could have 
sensibly eased the situation if spent in measured amounts earlier, 
suddenly appear as resources for "crash" programs or frenzied ac-
tions to be mounted on a war footing! The funds are spent but rarely 
do the expenditures add significantly to the nation's productive ca-
pacity. The urgent programs for drilling wells in Bihar in 1967 is the 
only case I can think of where a lasting impact was made on local 
irrigation capacity. This is not the way to transform a nation's agri-
cultural base. 
The recent reports of the National Commission on Agriculture 
attempt to give voice to both a long range development strategy and 
the shorter run tactics of its implementation. I hope the work of the 
Commission will establish a framework that effectively ends what 
can only be seen as a history of vacillation in development efforts. 
The recent integration of the Irrigation Ministry into that for Agri-
culture is another positive step for a constancy in agricultural devel-
opment policies. Indian agricultural development planning and ac-
tion must be built around programs that will span one or two 
decades, each program composed of building block projects that 
mesh in time and space to add to available production as each is 
completed. An early example of this type of program is the Com-
mand Area Development Schemes now being implemented in vari-
ous parts of the country. But these can only be the beginning. In the 
long term these schemes must find their place as a sub-set of activity 
under larger, more comprehensive programs that will integrate all 
the elements of a modern agriculture into a plan stretching across a 
generation of development effort. 
I have stressed that India's farm level dynamic was generated by 
the profit that could be captured by the farmers who adopted a 
technology encompassing dwarf varieties, fertilizers and intensive 
irrigation. Yet after each good harvest grain prices have been al-
lowed to slip relative to farm costs. The most recent example of a 
profit squeeze on cultivators is the experience of 1975 when prices 
paid to farmers have fallen in some cases by more than 30 percent, a 
drop far from offset by the decline in fertilizer costs and made worse 
by higher charges for electricity, diesel fuel, manufactured farm im-
plements, insecticides, in short all farm costs. One can agree that 
farmers should be taxed now because of the profits they have made in 
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the past few years. But it is a short-sighted argument. Jt is the econ-
omy and the consumer who eventually bear an ultimate cost in the 
form of higher prices and depleted foreign exchange (for food im-
ports) because domestic food output has again stagnated as farmers 
lowered their production by reducing inputs. Other means should be 
found to tax agriculturists, reducing his profit from farming has not 
and will not be effective in the longer term. Indeed at the present 
time I find it surprising that farm prices are not being supported at 
levels that reflect recent increases in farm costs, levels that would be 
somewhat lower than market prices earlier in the year to ease con-
sumer hardship, but certainly at levels above procurement prices that 
have not changed in the past two years. Such a policy would hold 
farming profitable and move the nation a giant step towards food 
security. 
The unstable nature of farm profitability has, and will induce an 
instability in the nation's food output. In a country as vulnerable to 
monsoonal rains as India, the additional variation in food supply 
arising from economic factors is both unnecessary and dangerous. A 
policy aimed at sustaining the profitability of the nation's food agri-
culture would yield large dividends in the quest for a secure food 
supply. 
The stop-go somewhat ad hoc nature of India's food policies in 
the last twenty years must not continue longer if the nation's integ-
rity is not to be imperilled. Time is desperately short. The global food 
situation is too close to the lifeboat analogy for complacency, and the 
nation's population will continue to grow and demand food as their 
right as Indian citizens. The task ahead is staggering in its immensity 
for in the next 25 years India must modernize a major part of its 
farming if it is to double its food output for the 950 million people 
who will want their daily grain. While the past quarter century has 
seen the addition of roughly 60 million tonnes to national food 
output, these were relatively easy gains - more than half came in the 
first ten years. From now on the pull will be hard and heavy. The 
policies underlying it must be sure of purpose and enduring. Be it 
otherwise and the game is lost. 
The nation has the physical and human resources not only to 
meet the challenge of the future, but also to contribute mightily to 
total world food output. Focussed and sustained policies for food 
output growth vigorously pursued over the next decade can and will 
make this country securely food self-sufficient, even place it firmly in 
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the ranks of the great world food producers. The task now is to build 
a vision of Indian agriculture as a modern economic sector of a 
modern nation. And to act to make this vision a reality. The begin-
nings have been made and given the political will for purposive and 
enduring action, I have no doubt there will be food abundance for all. 
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